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This paper presents a theoretical model of rational retrospective vot-
ing, which is tested empirically on pooled cross-sectional and panel data
from the Swedish Election Studies between 1985 and 1994 supplemented
with time series on inﬂation and unemployment. Compared with the
cross-sectional estimates, the panel estimates indicate a relatively greater
impact of macroeconomic variables on the individual vote. The principal
ﬁnding is, however, that microeconomic variables inﬂuence the vote about
as much as macroeconomic variables do. In consequence, self-interest ap-
pears to be an important part of an adequate understanding of economic
voting in Sweden. Regarding the determination of election outcomes,
macroeconomic variables have been more inﬂuential.
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11. Introduction
To what extent does self-interest explain vote choice? This much debated question
has led researchers to examine the relative impact of macro- and microeconomic
variables on the vote. If voters are primarily driven by self-interest and therefore
support governments that advance their individual economic interests, microeco-
nomic variables are expected to in￿uence the vote. If voters are concerned with
some conception of the public interest, one expects macroeconomic variables to in-
￿uence the vote. However, since a prosperous economy is bene￿cial to everyone
regardless of the concern for fellow citizens, responses to macroeconomic variables
do not rule out self-interest. Consequently, it is only possible to test whether voters
are altruists. If responses to microeconomic variables are considerable, this hypoth-
esis can be rejected.1
This paper develops a simple theoretical model of economic voting and tests it on
Swedish data. The model formalizes the discussion on economic voting by capturing
implicit assumptions in the empirical literature. In particular, the model shows how
individuals can use economic variables to infer how much they have to gain from the
reelection of the incumbent government; in other words that retrospective voting is
rational.2
The model contains two motivations of retrospective voting.3 The ￿rst moti-
vation originates from Downs (1957), who argues that policies of political parties
are stable over time. Because of this, retrospective voting helps to predict the
policies that candidates from the incumbent government would implement if they
1Since a wide de￿nition of self-interest makes this interpretation of economic voting very diﬃcult
to refute, it has been argued that only responses to microeconomic variables should be interpreted
as signs of self-interest. See Lewin (1991) for an elaboration of this view.
2With retrospective voting I mean voting based on results as opposed to prospective voting,
which is based on intentions. Fiorina (1981, p. 8) notes that ￿The traditional theory of retrospec-
tive voting implicitly assumes that citizens are more concerned about actual outcomes than about
the particular means of achieving those outcomes￿.
3The model disregards electoral control as a motivation for retrospective voting. This view of
elections as a disciplining device can be found in Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986).
2were reelected.4 The second motivation accentuates a factor omitted by Downs,
the government￿s competence. In this manner, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Ro-
goﬀ and Sibert (1988), Rogoﬀ (1990), and Persson and Tabellini (1990) argue that
certain economic variables are noisy signals of the government￿s competence. If
competence is persistent, it is rational to support the incumbent government when
macroeconomic outcomes are better than expected. In such situations, there is a
good chance that the competence of the government is high. However, the citizens
in these models are assumed to be identical￿an obvious drawback if one wants to
explain voting on the individual level.
The model contains both of these explanations of retrospective voting and also
allows for heterogeneity among the citizens. In particular I assume that the incum-
bent government redistributes income among the citizens in a way that is persistent
through time. In combination with the information assumptions of the model, this
implies that the income of each citizen will aﬀect his vote.
The vast empirical literature on economic voting started with the contributions
of Kramer (1971), Mueller (1970), and Goodhart and Bhansali (1970). After this
breakthrough in the early 1970s, numerous aggregate studies have followed. Nannes-
tad and Paldam (1994) call attention to four robust results: (1) people hold the
government responsible for economic conditions, (2) in most cases, unemployment
and in￿ation generate the most signi￿cant coeﬃcients, (3) the voters￿ expectations
are retrospective with a short time horizon, and (4) to rule costs popularity. How-
ever, aggregate studies only con￿rm that economics in￿uences elections and do not
distinguish between macro- and microeconomic conditions.5
4Alesina and Spear (1988) explain the consistency of a party￿s policies with a transfer scheme
that is contingent on the incumbent￿s good behavior in an overlapping generations model. Har-
rington (1992) assumes that a lame duck incumbent prefers a successor from his own party and
therefore refrain from implementing his own ideology since this reinforces the reputation of future
candidates from his party.
5Since this paper investigates economic voting in Sweden, the evidence from this country is also
worth mentioning. In addition to the early contributions of ¯kerman (1946, 1947), at least four
aggregate studies have been made on Swedish data. Frey (1979) reports that the rate of in￿ation
and the rate of unemployment had a signi￿cant and negative impact on government popularity in
3The ￿rst investigation of the relative impact of macro- and microeconomic vari-
ables on the vote was made by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979). They found that US vot-
ers responded almost exclusively to macroeconomic variables. Kinder and Kiewiet
used survey data and their results have been corroborated in numerous similar
studies. Most notably by Lewis-Beck (1988) in a comprehensive investigation of
economic voting in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United States.
The only Swedish study based on survey data is Holmberg (1984). His conclusion
is that economic factors were of some importance in the Swedish election of 1982.
However, short-run changes in the perceived ￿nancial situation of the citizens oﬀered
only a minor explanation of their votes. Lewin (1991) reviews the aggregate and
cross-sectional studies and concludes that the ￿ndings of relatively modest eﬀects
of microeconomic variables make the hypothesis of self-interest untenable. Another
review, with a more cautious interpretation, is Nannestad and Paldam (1994).
A drawback with cross-sectional survey data is that macroeconomic variables are
by de￿nition constant across individuals. In view of this, researchers have chosen
to work with perceptions of these variables. While it is true that perceptions￿even
if they are incorrect￿matter in forming opinions, the link from changes in economic
variables to changes in perceptions is clearly missing in these studies. If one wants
to know how economic variables aﬀect voting, it makes good sense to pool data
from several elections. The pooling of cross-sections enables the incorporation of
economic time series into the data set and estimation of the model using objective
instead of subjective economic variables.
the post-war years, whereas the growth of real income had a signi￿cant and positive impact in the
same period. Considering the vote share of the incumbent government, only changes in the rate
of unemployment had a signi￿cant (and negative) eﬀect when all variables were simultaneously
included in the model. Jonung and Wadensj￿ (1979) ￿nd that in￿ation and unemployment exerted
as t r o n ga n dn e g a t i v ei n ￿uence on the support for the ruling Social Democratic Party during
the period 1967￿1976. In a similar study of nearly the same time period (1967￿1978), Hibbs
and Madsen (1981) ￿nd that the bloc of governing parties loses (gains) support when there are
unexpected increases (decreases) in unemployment or in￿ation and gain (loses) support when there
are unexpected increases (decreases) in disposable income growth relative to market income growth.
This is in line with the ￿ndings in Madsen (1980)￿that changes in the rate of unemployment, as
opposed to the level of unemployment, had a negative and signi￿cant eﬀect on the deviation from
normal vote of the incumbent parties in the period 1920￿1973.
4Up to the present, the ￿ndings from studies based on pooled cross-sectional data
do not tally with the ￿ndings from purely cross-sectional studies. Both Markus
(1988, 1992), who uses data from the American National Election Studies between
1956 and 1988, and Nannestad and Paldam (1997a) who investigate data from 28
Danish quarterly surveys between 1986 and 1992, ￿nd that voters respond at least as
much to micro- as to macroeconomic variables.6 One explanation of this diﬀerence
is that estimates based on survey responses may suﬀer from a simultaneity bias. In
particular, an individual￿s perception of the macroeconomy might be aﬀected by his
vote choice. Strong supporters of the incumbent government might be inclined to
adopt a relatively more favorable view of the state of the economy.
In this paper, I follow this most recent line of empirical research and estimate
the model on pooled data from the Swedish Election Studies of 1985, 1988, 1991,
and 1994 supplemented with time series on unemployment and in￿ation. Unlike the
previous empirical studies, I present estimates based on panel data in addition to the
estimates based on pooled cross sections. The most notable diﬀerence between the
speci￿cations with these diﬀerent kinds of data is that the impact of macroeconomic
variables on the vote is greater in the speci￿cations with panel data than in the cross-
sectional speci￿cations. The results also indicate that Swedish citizens respond
about as much to micro- as to macroeconomic variables when deciding how to vote.
In particular, the experience of unemployment has a strong impact on the vote.
Compared to a citizen who is employed, an unemployed citizen is much more likely
to vote for a left-wing and against a right-wing incumbent government.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
model. In section 3 the model is estimated. Section 4 oﬀers conclusions.
6Nannestad and Paldam (1997a, p 120) are more controversial and claim that ￿Danes are
mainly pocketbook voters￿.
52. A Model of Rational Retrospective Voting
The following model explains economic voting by each citizen￿s self-interest alone.
I assume that there are only two choices in an election: one left- and one right-wing
alternative, one of which constitutes the incumbent government. The model focuses
on the (incomplete) information of the citizens and in order to simplify the analysis,
I do not explicitly model the behavior of the government. Instead, the government￿s
competence and redistributive pro￿le directly in￿uence economic variables.7
Both real disposable income, wi,t, and the identity of the government matter for
citizens. This is captured by the following indirect utility function of a citizen:
Vi,t = wi,t + gtAi, (2.1)
where subindex i denotes a citizen, subindex t a time period, g ∈ {0,1} is an
indicator variable which equals one if the government in the last period was reelected
and A, the attitude towards the incumbent government, is citizen i￿s evaluation of
this alternative on matters such as ideology, personality, and noneconomic policy
issues. The citizens are rational and forward looking; each of them compares the
expected utility of reelecting the incumbent government with the expected utility
of electing the opposition.8 Thus citizen i votes for the incumbent government if
Et [wi,t+1 | gt+1 =1 ]+Ai,t >E t [wi,t+1 | gt+1 =0 ], (2.2)
where Et denotes expectations conditional on what the citizen knows in period t.
Each citizen is assumed to use historical data to forecast his income in the next time
7Obviously, such a model does not allow the government to signal its competence by policy
choices.
8Since the citizens have only two alternatives to choose between and cannot in￿uence the policy
of the elected government, it is optimal to vote sincerely. The paper does not deal with ￿the
paradox of voting￿ (see e.g. Downs, 1957 or Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). To evade the paradox,
one could assume either that all citizens vote or that the model only describes the behavior of the
citizens who make it to the polls.
6period conditional on the identity of the elected government.9 Since income depends
on both the competence and the redistributive pro￿le of the government, the vote
will be in￿uenced by forecasts of these characteristics of the government and the
opposition. Although the government￿s competence and redistributive pro￿le are
not observed directly, certain economic variables provide signals of these character-
istics. However, one diﬀerence between the two political alternatives is assumed to
be known by the citizens￿that social insurance is more generous under a left-wing
government. This distinction between the degree of certainty of diﬀerent political
characteristics is thought to re￿ect the fact that some policies (e.g. transfers) have
a direct (and thus more certain) impact on personal income, whereas other polices
(e.g. economic policies in general) have a more indirect (and thus more uncertain)
impact on personal income.
Following some of the literature on electoral cycles referred to in the introduc-
tion (especially Persson and Tabellini, 1990), I assume that the competence of the
government in￿uences economic variables. Moreover, competence is assumed to be
persistent. To be precise, it is assumed to be a moving average given by
κt = ￿t + gt￿t−1, (2.3)
where ￿t is a random shock with mean zero and variance σ2
￿.10 The assumption
that competence is persistent is crucial but hardly unreasonable. The citizens ob-
serve κt with a one-period delay. Diﬀerences in competence between government
and opposition re￿ect their diﬀerent abilities to solve current economic problems.
Competence is assumed to be a random variable since the nature of the economic
9The model is unrealistic in the sense that voters are often found to have a very vague knowledge
about the state of the economy. The model may however be defended by referring to Sanders
(2000), who argues that (British) voters are quite aware of the general macroeconomic situation
and that their knowledge matters electorally.
10Fair (1978) ￿nds that the economic performance of previous presidents from the opposition
party does not in￿uence the voters in US presidential elections.
7problems changes over time.
Regarding macroeconomic variables, in￿ation and unemployment are the most
obvious candidates to be included in the model since they are typically found to
have the most signi￿cant eﬀects (Paldam, 1997) and are almost always included in
vote and popularity functions. Besides, unemployment is particularly suitable for
this study due to its existence on the macro- as well as on the microeconomic level.
Speci￿cally, I assume that changes in the rate of in￿ation, ∆π, and unemployment,
∆U, depend on the competence of the government. Since a new government ￿in-
herits￿ rates of in￿ation and unemployment, this seems to be a more reasonable
approximation than to let the levels of these variables be in￿uenced by the gov-
ernment￿s competence.11 Thus, changes in in￿ation and unemployment are given
by
∆πt = −κt + δt (2.4)
and
∆Ut = −κt + γt, (2.5)
where δt and γt are unobserved random variables with mean zero and variance σ2
δ
and σ2
γ . Furthermore, the relative change in the real income of each citizen, ∆wi,t,
is supposed to be given by the following expression:
∆wi,t = κt + ui,tαg,t + θi,t + ρi,t, (2.6)
where ui,t is an indicator variable which equals one if citizen i is unemployed in





is an idiosyncratic shock
11See Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Jackman et al (1991) for evidence of persistent un-
employment, and Fuhrer and Moore (1995) for evidence of persistent in￿ation.
8and αg,t < 0 is the impact of unemployment on the relative change in real income.
Both αg,t and the analogous characteristic of the opposition, αo,t, are assumed to
be known by all citizens. Finally, θi,t is the net eﬀect of redistribution to citizen i
excluding unemployment insurance. Contrary to αg,t and αo,t, θi,t is unknown to
t h ec i t i z e ns i n c ei tc a p t u r e st h ee ﬀect of policies that have a more indirect impact on
the citizen￿s income. This variable has the same dynamic structure as competence:
θi,t = νi,t + gtνi,t−1, (2.7)
where νi,t is a random variable with mean zero and variance σ2
ν . Each citizen
observes νi,t with a delay of one period. All random variables are assumed to be
independent.
In order to compare the government with the opposition, the citizens have to
estimate the variables κt and θi,t on the basis of knowing only ∆πt, ∆Ut, ∆wi,t
and ui,tαg as well as the means, second moments and cross second moments of the
random variables. Starting with κt, the citizens observe three signals of this random
variable. Using linear least square projection (described in Appendix A), the best





















































cording to (2.8), each voter￿s expectation of the government￿s competence, ￿ κt,i s
decreasing in ∆πt and in ∆Ut but increasing in ∆wi,t. Comparing the weights of
in￿ation and unemployment, we see that the noisier variable receives the smaller
12For convenience, we assume ￿t−1 =0 ,w h i c hi m p l i e s￿ κt =￿ κt+1. We also assume νt−1 =0 ,
which simpli￿es (2.9) and implies ￿ θt = ￿ θt+1.
9weight. Intuitively, if σ2
δ > σ2
γ , a given change in unemployment contains more
information on the government￿s competence than the same change in in￿ation.
Likewise, contrary to the weight on ∆wi,t − ui,tαg,t the weights on ∆πt and ∆Ut
depend positively on σ2
ν and σ2
ρ, since high variation in ∆wi,t due to redistribution
and chance reduces the information on κt contained in ∆wi,t−ui,tαg,t.B yt h es a m e
logic, the weight on ∆wi,t − ui,tαg,t increases in σ2
δ and in σ2
γ
Next, each citizen￿s knowledge of ∆πt, ∆Ut, ∆wi,t and ui,tαg also provides
information on θi,t and therefore, according to (2.7), on the expectation of θi,t+1 (if

























Equation (2.9) tells us that the estimate of θi,t is increasing in ∆πt and ∆Ut
since rising in￿ation and unemployment decreases the estimate of κt,m a k i n gi t
more likely that a higher wage is due to redistribution. The ratio of these weights
is the same as in (2.8). Moreover, the weight on ∆wi,t −ui,tαg,t is greater than the
weights on ∆πt and ∆Ut since ∆wi,t depends on both κt and θi,t.
By substituting the estimates ￿ κt+1 (2.8) and ￿ θi,t+1 (2.9) into (2.2), one gets a








































This condition states that a citizen is more likely to support an incumbent gov-
ernment if his attitude towards it is more positive than his attitude towards the
opposition (Ai > 0). He is also more likely to support the government if the rate of
10in￿ation or unemployment has decreased or if his own income has increased. Re-
garding unemployment on the personal level there are two eﬀects at work. First,
experience of unemployment increases the support for a left-wing incumbent gov-
ernment, since in this case αg,t − αo,t > 0 and we assume Pr[ui,t+1 =1| ui,t =1 ]
≥ Pr[ui,t+1 =1| ui,t =0 ] . Second, the experience of unemployment (ui,t =1 )i n -
creases the estimates of competence, ￿ κt+1, and net redistribution, ￿ θi,t+1,f o rag i v e n
change in real income (since αg,t < 0). The interaction of the two eﬀects is such
that the left hand side of (2.10) is greater for ui,t =1than for ui,t =0if there is a
left-wing government. With a right-wing government it is ambiguous whether the
expression is greater for ui,t =1or ui,t =0 . It is more likely to be greater for ui,t =0
if Pr[ui,t+1 =1| ui,t =1 ]is considerably greater than Pr[ui,t+1 =1| ui,t =0 ]or if
αg,t is much smaller than αo,t.
The model can be estimated as a model for binary choice if a disturbance term
is added to (2.10). This estimation is done in the next section. Equation (2.10) also
formally con￿rms that even if citizens are motivated by self-interest, macroeconomic
variables can indeed be expected to in￿uence their votes. Regarding the relative
impact of changes in the macroeconomic variables, we expect the variance of the
changes in in￿ation and unemployment to be the determining factor. From (2.4) and
(2.5), we see that the variable with the greater variance contains less information on
competence. In consequence, the model predicts that a citizen in the voting booth
reacts less to a given change in this variable.
113. Empirical Investigation
3.1. Data
The data set13 contains information on individuals from the four most recent Swedish
Election Studies (1985, 1988, 1991 and 1994)14 complemented with time series on
in￿ation, unemployment and real GDP growth for the same period of time. The
election studies are made in the form of a two-step panel in which each respondent
is interviewed twice and one half of them is replaced in each study. The popula-
tion of the Swedish Election Studies is the Swedish electorate (aged 18￿80) and the
nonresponse rate ranges between 18.2 and 27 percent (in 1982 and 1991). Since the
all of the economic variables of interest are not included in the election study of
1982, it is not meaningful to go further back in time than 1985. In three of the four
terms of oﬃce under study the government is classi￿ed as left-wing. The last term
of oﬃce (1991￿94) is the exception with a governing coalition which is classi￿ed
as right-wing. Consequently, the governing coalition retained its majority in the
elections of 1985 and 1988, whereas the elections of 1991 and 1994 resulted in a
transfer of power.
Although Sweden has a multi-party system, I follow the common practice15 of
treating it as a two-bloc system.16 For the period of study, this does not seem to
violate the actual situation in the Swedish Parliament very much. The dependent
variable in all estimations is choice of political bloc. Votes for one of the parties in
the bloc with a majority in parliament are coded one and votes for other parties are
13The major part of the data in this paper has been made available by the Swedish Social Science
Data Service (SSD). The data in the Swedish Election Studies was originally collected in a research
project at the Department of Political Science at G￿teborg University, under the guidance of S￿ren
Holmberg and Mikael Gilljam. Neither SSD nor the primary researchers are responsible for the
analyses presented in this paper.
14In one case I also use data from the election study of 1982 in order to compute the variable
∆wi,t.
15See e.g. Alesina et al. (1997), Laver and Scho￿eld (1990), Johansson (1999) and Pettersson
Lidbom (2000).
16The left-wing bloc includes the Social Democratic Party, the Leftist Party and the Green
Party. The right-wing bloc includes the Conservative Party, the Centrist Party, the Liberal Party,
the Christian Democratic Party and the New Democratic Party.
12coded zero. The independent variables ∆Ut, ∆πt, ∆wi,t, Left, Right are objec-
tive, whereas the other independent variables, P(Macro), P(Micro) ,a n dui,t,a r e
subjective (P indicates the perception of the variable). As in the related literature,
the control variable for political preferences or attitudes, Attitude, is constructed
from sociodemographic characteristics. A description of all the variables is given in
Appendix B.
3.1.1. Estimates Based on Pooled Cross Sections
Although cross sectional data have the well known drawback that estimation results
may be biased in the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity, I present such
results in order to compare them with previous studies and with estimates based on
panel data. Because of this intention, most of the sensitivity analysis don￿t appear
until the estimates based on panel data are presented. In accordance with the
theoretical analysis of the previous section, I estimate the model with the probit
model of binary choice. Due to data limitations, it is not possible to estimate
the model with objective data only. Because of this and also in order to address
the issue of sensitivity to diﬀerent speci￿cations, I report estimation results from
three speci￿cations with diﬀerent combinations of subjective and objective economic
variables.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes two objective macroeconomic variables, changes
in the rates of unemployment and in￿ation (∆Ut and ∆πt)t o g e t h e rw i t has u b j e c -
tive microeconomic measure of the self-reported change in the ￿nancial situation
of the citizen￿s houshold. This variable, P (Micro), is trichotomous: ￿worse￿ is
coded -1, ￿about the same￿ is coded 0, and ￿better￿ is coded 1. Thus, the ￿rst
speci￿cation of the model is:
13Pr(Vo t e=1 )=Φ(a + b1∆Ut + b2∆πt + c1P (Micro)+c2 (Left ∗ ui,t)+c3 (Right ∗ ui,t)+dAi),
(3.1)
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution, Left and Right are dummy
variables indicating left- and right-wing governments, and Ai denotes the control
variable Attitude. The dependent variable Vot e equals one if the citizen votes
for the incumbent government and zero otherwise. Coeﬃcients for macroeconomic
variables are indicated b and coeﬃcients for microeconomic variables are indicated
c.
In the second speciﬁcation I switch to using an objective measure of ∆wi,t,t h e
percentage change in real income net of taxes since the previous election. Unfor-
tunately, the data on income are not as exact in the election study of 1988 as it
is in the other studies. Therefore estimation with ∆wi,t as one of the independent
variables is restricted to the elections of 1985 and 1994. Because of this, I use a
subjective measure of changes in macroeconomic conditions instead of ∆Ut and ∆πt
in this speci￿cation. This subjective variable P (Macro) is trichotomous with the
same coding as the analogous variable P (Micro). Thus, the second speci￿cation
is:
Pr(vote=1)=Φ(a + b1P (Macro)+c1∆wi,t + c2 (Left ∗ ui,t)+c3 (Right ∗ ui,t)+dAi).
(3.2)
The third speciﬁcation contains both of the mentioned subjective measures and
is written as follows:
14Pr(vote=1)=Φ(a + b1P (Macro)+c1P (Micro)+c2 (Left ∗ ui,t)+c3 (Right ∗ ui,t)+dAi).
(3.3)
The theoretical model predicts b1 and b2 in the ￿rst speci￿cation to be negative
and b1 in the other two speci￿cations to be positive. In all speci￿cations, c1 and c2
are predicted to be positive. Regarding a and c3, the predicted signs are ambiguous,
but, for reasons explained in the previous section, we expect c3 <c 2.
Table 1 displays the estimation results. Column 1 contains the estimates from
the ￿rst, column 2 from the second, and column 3 from the third speci￿cation.17
For all speci￿cations, the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients are consistent with
the predictions of the theoretical model. In the ￿rst and in the third speci￿cation
all coeﬃcients are also statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level (except for
Right∗ui,t whose sign was expected to be ambiguous). For the second speci￿cation
the picture is less clear; neither the coeﬃcient for ∆wi,t nor the one for Left∗ui,t is
signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. However, the small and insigni￿cant coeﬃcient for
∆wi,t may well be due to a shortcoming in the income measure. The election studies
contain the respondents￿ income in the year before the election, which is unfortunate
since the empirical evidence suggests that the eﬀect of changing economic conditions
is of a short duration (see e.g. Paldam, 1997).
17Allowing observations from the same year to be dependent (but still assuming independence
across years) does not change the levels of statistical signi￿c a n c ei nT a b l e1i na n yi m p o r t a n tw a y .












Left*ui,t .751** .869 .756**
(.267) (.558) (.276)
Right*ui,t -.440* -.367 -3.09
(.212) (.211) (.209)
Control variable Attitude 2.809** 3.138** 2.823**
(.120) (.179) (.122)
Constant -1.487** -1.437** -1.404**
(.069) (.097) (.067)
Elections 1985￿94 1985, 1994 1985￿94
Log likelihood -2,089 -941 -2,002
Correct predictions 69.0% 72.8% 70.4%
#O b s e r v a t i o n s 3522 1747 3522
Probit model. The dependent variable vote is coded 1 for government and 0
for opposition. Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates signi￿cance at
the 5% level. ** indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level.
16It is also worth noting that c3,t h ec o e ﬃcient for Right∗ui,t, in all cases turned
out to be smaller than c2 just as the model predicted. Moreover, in none of the
speci￿cations it is possible to reject the hypothesis c2 = −c3 by a Wald test.18
This may be interpreted as an indication that the experience of unemployment only
in￿uences the vote through diﬀerences in expected provision of insurance against
unemployment and not through estimates of competence and net redistribution.
Within the framework of the model, this means that the only eﬀect of unemploy-
ment appears to work through the term Pr[ui,t+1](αg,t − αo,t) in equation (2.10).
Because of the more generous social insurance under a left-wing government, this
term switches sign (from positive to negative) when such a government is replaced
by a right-wing government and vice versa.
Finally we note that the coeﬃcient for ∆Ut is considerably larger than the
coeﬃcient for ∆πt (in absolute values). Since the variance of ∆Ut is only a fraction
o ft h ev a r i a n c eo f∆πt, this is exactly what the model predicts (see equation 2.10).
Further interpretation of the estimated coeﬃcients is facilitated by comparing
predicted probabilities for diﬀerent sets of values of the explanatory variables. Since
the probit model is nonlinear, the partial derivatives of the probabilities with re-
spect to the explanatory variables depend on the values of all explanatory variables.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 display predicted probabilities which indicate the potential im-
pact on the vote of changes in the variables of interest (evaluated at focal values
of the other explanatory variables). In all of the speci￿cations, the experience of
unemployment under a left-wing government (Left ∗ ui,t =1 ) has a considerable
impact on the vote although the standard errors are quite large. The tables also
reveal that the potential impact on the predicted probabilities are greater for sub-
jective economic variables (P (Macro) and P (Micro)) than for objective economic
variables (∆Ut, ∆πt and ∆wi,t). This is especially evident for the impact of changes
18In none of the speci￿cations does ui,t enter signi￿cantly if we let it replace the variables
Left ∗ ui,t and Right ∗ ui,t.
17in the microeconomic situation (P (Micro) and ∆wi,t), which is substantial in Table
2 and 4 but minute in Table 3.
Table 2 Predicted probabilities to vote for the government in the ﬁrst
cross sectional speciﬁcation
min -s t .d e v . mean* +s t .d e v . max
Macroeconomic ∆Ut .515 .506 .463 .421 .405
variables (.009) (.014) (.009) (.014) (.018)
∆πt .494 .500 .463 .427 .410
(.013) (.014) (.009) (.013) (.017)
Microeconomic P(Micro) .395 .463 .533
variables (.015) (.009) (.015)
Left ￿ ui,t .463 .745
(.009) (.086)
Right ￿ ui,t .463 .297
(.009) (.073)
Each row of the table shows how the probability to vote for the government
changes when certain variables are varied and the others are held constant.
The ￿rst row, for example, shows that this probability is .405 when ∆Ut is at
its maximum and .515 when it is at its minimum. Probabilities are based on
column 1 in Table 1. In each case, the other variables are assigned the follow-
ing values: ∆Ut=1 .5 (mean), ∆πt= −2.101 (mean), P(Micro)=0(mid-
point), Left ￿ ui,t=0 , Right ￿ ui,t=0 , Attitude = .505 (mean). Stan-
dard errors (calculated with the ￿delta method￿) are in parentheses.
* midpoint in the case of P(Micro).
18Table 3 Predicted probabilities to vote for the government in the
second cross sectional speciﬁcation
25th 0 75th
min percentile percentile max
Macroeconomic P(Macro) .350 .558 .751
variable (.015) (.016) (.023)
Microeconomic ∆wi,t .558 .558 .559
variables (.016) (.016) (.016)
Left ￿ ui,t .558 .845
(.016) (.140)
Right ￿ ui,t .558 .413
(.016) (.082)
Each row of the table shows how the probability to vote for the government
changes when certain variables are varied and the others are held constant.
The ￿rst row, for example, shows that this probability is .751 when P(Macro)
is at its maximum. Probabilities are based on column 2 in Table 1. In each
case, the other variables are assigned the following values: P(Macro)=0
(midpoint), ∆wi,t=0 , Left ￿ ui,t=0 , Right ￿ ui,t=0 , Attitude = .505
(mean). Standard errors (calculated with the ￿delta method￿) are in paren-
theses.
19Table 4 Predicted probabilities to vote for the government in the third
cross sectional speciﬁcation
min midpoint max
Macroeconomic P(Macro) .359 .509 .657
variable (.011) (.010) (.016)
Microeconomic P(Micro) .465 .509 .552
variables (.016) (.010) (.015)
Left ￿ ui,t .509 .782
(.010) (.081)
Right ￿ ui,t .509 .387
(.010) (.080)
Each row of the table shows how the probability to vote for the government
changes when certain variables are varied and the others are held constant.
The ￿rst row, for example, shows that this probability is .657 when P(Macro)
is at its maximum. Probabilities are based on column 3 in Table 1. In each
case, the other variables are assigned the following values: P(Macro)=0
(midpoint), P(Micro)=0(midpoint), Left ￿ ui,t =0 , Right ￿ ui,t =
0, Attitude = .505 (mean). Standard errors (calculated with the ￿delta
method￿) are in parentheses.
Even though the estimates are sensitive to the empirical speci￿cation of the
model, the estimates clearly suggests that both macro- and microeconomic vari-
ables in￿uence voting behavior substantially. In particular, it is not possible to
claim that the impact of microeconomic variables on the vote is negligible. Ob-
viously it is diﬃcult to compare the eﬀects of the macro- and the microeconomic
variables on the vote. One has to accept a certain amount of arbitrariness in order
to make the quantitative and qualitative variables comparable. In order to make
such a comparison, Table 2 contains predicted probabilities for values of ∆Ut and
∆πt that are one standard deviation above and below the means of these vari-
ables. Comparing a ￿standard change￿, where one of these variables increases from
20its mean to a value of one standard deviation above its mean, with a one unit
change in the microeconomic variables P(Micro) and Left￿ui,t,t h ee ﬀects of the
microeconomic variables appear to be greater in this speci￿cation. In the second
speci￿cation, the eﬀect of the macroeconomic variable P(Macro) appears to be
greater than the eﬀects of microeconomic variables (Table 3), but the mentioned
drawbacks to the variable ∆wi,t makes this comparison less interesting. In the third
speci￿cation (Table 4), it is true that the eﬀect of P(Macro) is greater than the
eﬀect of P(Micro), but the largest eﬀect is the one of Left ￿ ui,t.T h u s i n t h e
two most interesting of the three speci￿cations, changes in microeconomic variables
aﬀect the predicted probability to vote for the government more than ￿standard￿
changes in macroeconomic variables do.
3.2. Estimates Based on Panel Data
Since each respondent in the Swedish Election Studies is interviewed twice, it is pos-
sible to use panel data when estimating the model in order to control for unobserved
individual heterogeneity. I apply the random eﬀects probit model. With panel data,
the dependent variable Vo t eis recoded to indicate choice of bloc (left-wing=1) since
it is reasonable to interpret the unobserved heterogeneity as the individual￿s polit-
ical bias in favor of one of the blocs (I have chosen the left-wing bloc). Thus, it
is no more necessary to include the control variable Attitude. In consequence of
this change, the variables ∆Ut, ∆πt, P(Macro) and P(Micro) are interacted with
incumbency status (left- or right-wing) in order to enter the speci￿c a t i o n sa sp r e -
dicted by the theoretical model. Using the whole unbalanced panel, estimates from
three diﬀerent speci￿cations are presented.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation contains the objective macroeconomic variables ∆Ut and
∆πt together with the subjective microeconomic variables P (Micro) and ui,t.
Thus, the ￿rst speci￿cation using panel data is:
21Pr(Vo t e=1 )=Φ(a + It (b1∆Ut + b2∆πt + c1P (Micro)) + c2ui,t + di), (3.4)
where It is an indicator variable which equals one in 1985, 1988 and 1991 (when
there were left-wing governments) and negative one in 1994 (when there was a
right-wing government) and di is the individual random eﬀect.
As a sensitivity check, the second speciﬁcation also contains the annual growth
of real GDP, a variable which is often included in voting models:
Pr(Vo t e=1 )=Φ(a + It (b1∆Ut + b2∆πt + b3∆GDPt + c1P (Micro)) + c2ui,t + di).
(3.5)
The third speciﬁcation contains subjective variables only and is written:
Pr(Vo t e=1 )=Φ(a + It (b1P (Macro)+c1P (Micro)) + c2ui,t + di). (3.6)
Table 5 displays the estimation results. Column 1 contains the estimates from
the ￿rst, column 2 from the second and column 3 from the third speci￿cation. For
all speci￿cations, the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients are consistent with the pre-
dictions of the theoretical model. All coeﬃcients except two are also statistically
signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level. The ￿rst exception is the coeﬃcients for ∆GDPt
in the second speci￿cation. This supports the choice of only including the changes
in unemployment and in￿a t i o ni nt h em o d e l . T h es e c o n de x c e p t i o ni st h ec o e ﬃ-
cient for ui,t in the third speci￿cation, which is marginally insigni￿cant at the 10
percent con￿dence level. A disadvantage with the third speci￿cation is that the
macroeconomic variable is subjective, which may open the door for perception bias.
22Compared to the cross sectional estimates in Table 1, the coeﬃcients for the macro-
economic variables, ∆Ut, ∆πt and P(Macro), are greater, whereas the impact of
personal unemployment is a bit smaller.
As a small sensitivity analysis, I have estimated the ￿rst and the third spec-
i￿cation on a balanced panel and for two shorter time periods. When reducing
the data set to a balanced panel with 3,706 observations, the only important dif-
ference compared with the estimates in Table 5 is that the coeﬃcient for ui,t is
marginally insigni￿cant at the 5 percent level in the ￿rst speci￿cation. When ex-
cluding the ￿rst step of the unbalanced panel (individuals observed in 1985 and
1988), the same coeﬃcient is not statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level.
When instead excluding the last step of the panel (individuals observed in 1991
and 1994), the coeﬃcient for ∆πt is no longer statistically signi￿cant in the ￿rst
speci￿cation, whereas the coeﬃcient for ui,t becomes statistically signi￿cant at the
one percent level both in the ￿rst and in the third speci￿cation. The estimates from
this sensitivity analysis are found in Appendix C.1920
Inspired by the ￿grievance asymmetry￿ found among Danish voters by Nannes-
tad and Paldam (1997b), I have also conducted tests for asymmetric eﬀects of eco-
nomic improvements and deteriorations. The tests only reveal such a pattern for the
variable P(Micro) in the third speci￿cation, and never for the variable P(Macro). In
the third speci￿cation, only deteriorations in the personal ￿nancial situation were
found to in￿uence the vote.
19Note that the exclusion of the last step of the panel (individuals observed in 1991 and 1994)
enables us to test Hibbs￿ (1987) diﬀerential partisan capability approach (since 1994 was the
only election with an incumbent right-wing government). Altough, the statistically insigni￿cant
eﬀect of ∆πt (see Appendix C) when making this exclusion is in line with Hibbs￿ approach, the
support for leftist parties was still found to be negatively correlated with ∆Ut,w h i c hc o n t r a d i c t s
the hypothesis that the support of a left-wing government should be unaﬀected or perhaps even
increased by unfavourable changes in unemployment. According to my results, it is only on the
personal level that unemployment increases the probability to vote for a left-wing government as
such. This is also the case if only the observations in 1994 are excluded.
20Note also that the estimated coeﬃcients and their standard errors in the ￿rst speci￿cation
(Table 5, column 1) hardly change at all if I use an expanded de￿nition of unemployment which
also includes people in short term labor market programmes in addition to the the oﬃcial unem-
ployment ￿gures that are used throughout this paper.
23Table 5 Panel Estimates
1 2 3








Microeconomic P(Micro) .165** .163** .079**
variables (.030) (.030) (.030)
ui,t .322* .323* .210
(.153) (.122) (.148)
Constant -.144** -.056** -.106**
(.027) (.122) (.025)
Elections 1985￿94 1985￿94 1985￿94
Log likelihood -3,665 -3,665 -3,605
Correct predictions 61.0% 61.0% 63.5%
#O b s e r v a t i o n s 5,700 5,700 5,700
ρ .482 .480 .443
Random eﬀects probit model. The dependent variable vote is coded 1 for left-
wing and 0 for right-wing governments. The variables ∆Ut, ∆πt, P(Macro),
and P(Micro) are interacted with the identity of the incumbent government
so that the coeﬃcients represent the impact on the propensity to vote for
the incumbent government. Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates
signi￿cance at the 5% level. ** indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level. ρ is
the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance
component.
24As was evident in the previous subsection, the estimated coeﬃcients are easier
to interpret if we compare predicted probabilities for diﬀerent sets of values of the
explanatory variables. Table 6, 7, and 8 display such predicted probabilities which
indicate the potential impact on the vote of certain changes in the variables of
interest. The striking dissimilarity to the potential impacts in Table 2 and 4 is
the considerable impact of changes in ∆Ut (Table 6). The impact of P(Macro) is
also greater than it was with cross sectional data, although this diﬀerence is less
dramatic. Thus the application of panel data indicates a greater importance of
macroeconomic variables than is the case with pooled cross sections.
Table 6 Predicted probabilities to vote for the left-wing bloc in the
ﬁrst panel speciﬁcation
min -s t .d e v . mean* +s t .d e v . max
Macroeconomic ∆Ut .599 .565 .397 .247 .199
variables (.012) (.012) (.013) (.017) (.018)
∆πt .499 .517 .397 .286 .241
(.018) (.019) (.013) (.013) (.014)
Microeconomic P(Micro) .335 .397 .462
variables (.017) (.013) (.017)
ui,t .397 .540
(.013) (.059)
Each row of the table shows how the probability to vote for the left-wing bloc
changes when certain variables are varied and the others are held constant.
The ￿rst row, for example, shows that this probability is .199 when ∆Ut is at
its maximum. Probabilities are based on column 1 in Table 6. In each case,
the other variables are assigned the following values: ∆Ui,t =1 .5 (mean),
∆πt =2 .101 (mean), P(Micro)=0(midpoint), ui,t =0 . Standard errors
(calculated with the ￿delta method￿) are in parentheses.
* midpoint in the case of P(Micro).
25Table 7 Predicted probabilities to vote for the left-wing bloc in the
third panel speciﬁcation
min midpoint max
Macroeconomic P(Macro) .258 .457 .669
variable (.012) (.010) (.013)
Microeconomic P(Micro) .427 .457 .489
variables (.016) (.010) (.015)
ui,t .457 .542
(.010) (.058)
Each row of the table shows how the probability to vote for the left-wing bloc
changes when certain variables are varied and the others are held constant.
The ￿rst row, for example, shows that this probability is .669 when P(Macro)
is at its maximum. Probabilities are based on column 3 in Table 6. In each
case, the other variables are assigned the following values: P(Macro)=0
(midpoint), P(Micro)=0(midpoint), ui,t=0 . Standard errors (calculated
with the ￿delta method￿) are in parentheses.
We also want to make the same kind of comparisons between the eﬀects of the
macro- and microeconomic variables as was done with the cross-sectional speci￿ca-
tions. In the ￿rst panel speci￿cation (Table 6), the eﬀect on the vote of a ￿standard￿
decrease in ∆Ut from its mean to one standard deviation below its mean is about
as great as the eﬀect of the dummy variable ui,t. At the same time, the eﬀect of the
same decrease in ∆πt is somewhat greater then the eﬀect of a one unit increase in
the other microeconomic variable P(Micro).T h u st h ee ﬀect of macroeconomic vari-
ables appears to be roughly as great as the eﬀect of microeconomic variables in this
speci￿cation. In the third panel speci￿cation on the other hand (Table 7), the eﬀect
of the subjective macroeconomic variable P(Macro) is considerably greater than
the eﬀect of the subjective macroeconomic variable P(Micro).T h u s t h e r e l a t i v e
26sizes of the macro- and the microeconomic eﬀects depend on the chosen empirical
speci￿cation. I am however inclined to put more weight on the speci￿cation with
objective macroeconomic variables since it eliminates perception biases from these
variables.
3.3. The Impact on Election Outcomes
So far, the analysis has focused on individual vote choice. In order to assess the
capacity of diﬀerent variables to aﬀect election outcomes we need to consider the
aggregate eﬀect of changes in the explanatory variables. Due to the close con-
nection between the variables ∆Ut and ui,t, I have chosen to investigate whether
unemployment in￿uences election outcomes mainly because rising unemployment
makes everybody believe that the government is less competent or mainly because
the unemployed vote diﬀerently than the employed. In addition, the personal un-
employment variable ui,t is more likely than P(Micro) to aﬀect election outcomes,
since many of the individual eﬀects of the latter variable cancel out in the aggregate.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h em o d e l ,t h et o t a le ﬀect of unemployment depends on the identity
of the incumbent government. With a left-wing government, the negative macro-
economic eﬀect of rising unemployment is mitigated by the positive eﬀect of the
increased support for the government among the unemployed. With a right-wing
government on the other hand, the macro- and the microeconomic eﬀect reinforce
each other. Even if the experience of unemployment has about the same poten-
tial to in￿uence on individual vote choice as changes in the rate of unemployment
have, the latter variable aﬀects every voter and may therefore be more important
for election outcomes.
In Table 8, the macro- and microeconomic eﬀects of unemployment on election
outcomes are compared by predicting the outcomes in the four elections under the
counterfactual absence of one of these eﬀects at a time. Obviously such a specula-
27tive exercise can only provide us with a very crude measure of actual and potential
in￿uences on election outcomes. Table 8 displays predicted vote shares in a hypo-
thetical case when nobody is unemployed (ui,t =0∀i) and in another hypothetical
case when the rate of unemployment is constant (∆Ut =0 ) for estimates based on
cross sectional and panel data. The cross sectional estimates have much smaller pre-
diction errors (especially in 1991). This is due to the absence of the control variable
Attitude in the speci￿cations based on panel data. The diﬀerences between the con-
ditional and unconditional vote shares suggest that the total macroeconomic eﬀect
of unemployment has been larger than the total microeconomic eﬀect. However,
the total microeconomic eﬀect of unemployment is not negligible. An additional
percentage point of the votes can very well be decisive in close races.
Table 8 The Governing Coalition’s Share of the Vote*
Cross section Panel
Actual Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted
Year Vote Share Vote Share given u=0 ∀ i given ∆U=0 Vote Share given u=0 ∀ i given ∆U=0
1985 51.1% 49.3% 48.8% 49.4% 51.7% 51.5% 53.9%
1988 56.5% 54.3% 54.0% 53.7% 59.0% 58.9% 54.8%
1991 44.1% 45.1% 44.7% 46.7% 24.6% 24.3% 34.5%
1994 42.3% 43.5% 44.4% 47.9% 36.6% 37.4% 68.5%
T h et a b l ei sb a s e do nt h ee s t i m a t e si nc o l u m n1i nT a b l e1a n di nT a b l e5 .
*among the parties that won seats in parliament
284. Concluding Remarks
The empirical results which are based on pooled cross-sections con￿rm the ￿ndings
in Markus (1988, 1992), and Nannestad and Paldam (1997a) that microeconomic
variables in￿uence voting decisions about as much as macroeconomic variables do.
Especially the experience of unemployment appears to have a considerable in￿uence
on the vote. The unemployed tend to support left-wing and oppose right-wing
governments. This is roughly in accordance with Nannestad and Paldam (1995),
who ￿nd that unemployed Danish voters turned away from Conservative-led but
not from Social Democratic-led governments.
For well known reasons, panel data exhibits several advantages which make the
results from panel estimations more reliable than cross-sectional results. Compared
to the empirical results based on cross-sections, the results that are based on panel
data indicate a stronger impact of macroeconomic variables. In the most plausible
speci￿cation, the eﬀects of the macroeconomic variables are about as great as the
eﬀects of the microeconomic variables.
Thus, the ￿ndings in this paper strike a balance between the ￿pocketbook￿
and the altruistic view of voting. In particular the results cast doubt on claims
in previous studies that changes in individual ￿nancial conditions have a minimal
impact on the vote. In fact, even if responses to macroeconomic variables are
assumed to be due to a concern for fellow citizens, which itself is far from clear,
self-interest still can be about as important for individual vote choice as is such an
altruistic concern.
Previously, the relative importance of self-interest as a vote motive has been
found to diﬀer substantially from one country to the next. Since this is the ￿rst
paper to investigate economic voting by applying panel data, there is an obvious
need for similar research for other countries. Nevertheless, the fact that Swedes ap-
pear to be more pocketbook oriented than Americans have been found to be, can be
29interpreted by the culture hypothesis of Nannestad and Paldam (1997a). According
to this hypothesis, Swedes ￿nd it more natural to hold the government responsible
for economic changes when compared with the more individualistic Americans. In-
deed, a distinguishing feature a welfare state is that the public sector actively tries
to in￿uence the welfare of the citizens.
Regarding the eﬀects of unemployment on election outcomes, the macroeco-
nomic eﬀect of unemployment appear to have a much larger potential of in￿uencing
outcomes compared with the microeconomic eﬀect. The total microeconomic eﬀect
of unemployment is, however, not negligible.
30Appendix A Linear Projections
A citizen has to estimate κt and θi,t on the basis of knowing ∆πt, ∆Ut and
(∆wi,t − ui,tαg,t). Since the citizen is supposed to know the means, second moments
and cross second moments of these variables, he can solve the problem by using
linear regression. In general, the linear least squares projection of a random variable
y on n+1 random variables x0,x 1,...,xn (x0 ≡ 1)i sd e n o t e dP [y | x0,x 1,...,xn] and
is found by minimizing
E (y − (a0 + a1x1 + ... + anxn))
2 (A1)
with respect to a0,a 1,...,an. The solution to this problem is given by the orthog-
onality principle (see e.g. Sargent, 1979). This principle states a set of necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for a0,a 1,...,an to minimize (A1), viz.
E [(y − (a0 + a1x1 + ... + anxn))xi]=0 ,i =0 ,...,n. (A2)
In our case of estimating κ, rearranging the orthogonality conditions in (A2)
yields:
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where w0 = ∆wi,t−ui,tαg,t and subindices are omitted. Using the relations in (2.3),
(2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7), these equations can be written
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Thus, the projection of κt on ∆πt, ∆Ut, (∆wi,t − ui,tαg,t) and a constant is





























32In the case of estimating θi,t,w eh a v e
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Using the relations in (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7), these equations can be
written
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Thus, the projection of θi,t on ∆πt, ∆Ut, (∆wi,t − ui,tαg,t) and a constant is




























33Appendix B Description of the Variables
Vote
This binary micro variable is coded diﬀerently in the cross-sectional and in the
panel speci￿cations. The variable is based on answers to the following question
in the Swedish election studies: ￿We had several elections at the same time this
year. Which party did You vote for in the general election?￿ To simplify matters,
votes for parties that did not win seats in parliament are coded as missing values.
In the cross-sectional speci￿cations, the variable is coded 1 if the individual voted
for any of the parties in the governing coalition and coded 0 for the parties in the
opposition, as described by the following table:
svm pmf pck dn y d
1985 11- 0 0 0- -
1988 111 0 0 0- -
1991 11- 0 0 00 0
1994 000 1 1 11 -
In the speci￿cations with panel data, the variable is coded 1 for left-wing parties
and 0 for right-wing parties, as described by the following table:
svm pmf pck dn y d
1985 11- 0 0 0- -
1988 111 0 0 0- -
1991 11- 0 0 00 0
1994 111 0 0 00 -
s: Socialdemokratiska arbetarpartiet (Social Democratic Party)
v: V￿nsterpartiet (Left Party)
mp: Milj￿partiet de gr￿na (Green Party)
m: Moderata Samlingspartiet (Conservative Party)
34c: Centerpartiet (Centrist Party)
kd: Kristdemokraterna (Christian Democratic Party)
nyd: Ny Demokrati (New Democratic Party)
∆U
The diﬀerence between average unemployment in the present and in the last
term of oﬃc e . B a s e do nt h eo ﬃcial ￿gures of the The National Labor Market
Board (AMS).
∆π
The diﬀerence between the annual in￿ation during the present and the last term
of oﬃce.
∆GDP
The diﬀerence between the annual rate of real GDP growth during the present
and the last term of oﬃce.
U ∆U π ∆π ∆GDP
1983-85 3.2 .3 8.0 -3.4 2.3
1986-88 2 . 7- . 6 4 . 7- 3 . 41 . 7
1989-91 1.9 1.6 8.7 4.1 .5
1992-94 6 . 84 . 7 3 . 0- 5 . 7- . 5
Mean 3 . 71 . 5 6 . 1- 2 . 11 . 0
St. Dev. 1 . 52 . 3 2 . 74 . 3 1 . 2
P(Macro)
Perception of the change in the country￿s economy. The variable is based on
answers to the following question: ￿According to your own opinion, how has the
Swedish economy developed the last two or three years. Has it gotten better, stayed
35about the same or gotten worse?￿ Better is coded 1, about the same is coded 0 and
worse is coded -1.
∆w
The relative change in personal income net of taxes between the year before the
election of study and the year before the last election. If the income in either year
equals zero, the value is assumed to be missing.
P(Micro)
Perception of the change in the own ￿nancial situation. The variable is based
on answers to the following question: ￿If you compare your ￿nancial situation with
how it was two or three years ago, has it gotten better, stayed about the same or
has it gotten worse?￿ It is coded as P(Macro).
u
Dummy variable coded one if the respondent had been unemployed since the







Dummy variable indicating a left-wing government. It is coded one in 1985,
1988 and 1991.
Right
Dummy variable indicating a right-wing government. It is coded one in 1994.
36Attitude
The structurally determined probability to support the incumbent government.
Computed as the predicted probability to vote for any of the parties in the governing
coalition based on the following variables: education, church attendance, sector of
employment (private or public), home ownership, occupation, and the home town￿s
population. The following table displays the estimates used for the computations:












#O b s e r v a t i o n s 3,926
Probit model. The dependent variable vote is coded 1 for the left-wing parties
(s, v and mp) and 0 for the right-wing parties (m, fp, c, kd, nyd). * indicates
signi￿cance at the 10% level. ** indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level. The
following explanatory variables are all dummy variables:
37Edu1 High school (gymnasium) graduate without higher education.
Edu2 At least some college.
Church Goes to church at least once a month.
Public Employed in the public sector.
Home Owns the own home.
Country Lives in the country or in a small town.
Laborer Laborer by profession.
E H O E n t r e p r e n e u ro rh i g h e ro ﬃcial by profession.
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Cases
P(Macro) -.30 .85 -1.00 1.00 4,199
∆w .66 4.38 -.99 112.30 5,937
P(Micro) .03 .76 -1.00 1.00 4,404
u .03 .16 0 1.00 4,703
Attitude .51 .20 .04 .95 5425
38Appendix C Sensitivity Analysis
Unbalanced panel Balanced panel
1 2 3 4 5 6
Macroeconomic ∆Ut -.161** -.220** -.296**
variables (.013) (.014) (.075)
∆πt -.053** -.073** .002
(.007) (.010) (.022)
P(Macro) .477** .625** .540**
(.031) (.038) (.037)
Microeconomic P(Micro) .159** .092* .181** .116** .206** .109**
variables (.037) (.036) (.045) (.042) (.042) (.041)
ui,t .374 .294 .265 .227 .900** .874**
(.192) (.185) (.198) (.185) (.327) (.326)
Constant -.109** -.096** -.222** -.252** .128* .069
(.035) (.033) (.050) (.041) (.061) (.036)
Elections 1985￿94 1985￿94 1988￿94 1988￿94 1985￿91 1985￿91
Log likelihood -2,386 -2,364 -2,583 -2,273 -2,583 -2,494
Correct predictions 59.6% 61.9% 60.8% 63.4% 60.4% 63.5%
#O b s e r v a t i o n s 3,706 3,706 3,731 3,731 3,982 3,982
ρ .493 .453 .670 .616 .635 .601
Notes: see Table 5.
39References
Alesina, A., and S. E. Spear (1988), ￿An Overlapping Generations Model
of Electoral Competition,￿ Journal of Public Economics 37, 359￿379.
Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. Cohen (1997), Political Cycles and the
Macroeconomy, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Barro, R. J. (1973), ￿The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model,￿
Public Choice 14, 19￿42.
Blanchard, O., and L. Summers (1986), ￿Hysteresis and the European
Unemployment Problem,￿ NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 15￿78.
Cukierman, A., and A. H. Meltzer (1986), ￿A Positive Theory of Dis-
cretionary Policy, the Cost of Democratic Government, and the Bene￿ts
of a Constitution,￿ Economic Inquiry 24, 367￿388.
Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy,N e wY o r k :H a r p e r
and Row.
Fair, R. C. (1978), ￿The Eﬀect of Economic Events on Votes for Presi-
dent,￿ The Review of Economics and Statistics 60, 159￿173.
Ferejohn, J. (1986), ￿Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,￿
Public Choice 50, 5￿25.
Fiorina, M. P. (1981), Retrospective Voting in American National Elec-
tions, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Frey, B. S. (1979), ￿Politometrics of Government Behavior in a Democ-
racy,￿ Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81, 308￿322.
Fuhrer, J., and G. Moore (1995), ￿In￿ation Persistence,￿ Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 110, 127￿159.
Goodhart, C. A. E., and R. J. Bhansali (1970), ￿Political Economy,￿
Political Studies 18, 43￿106.
Harrington, J. H. (1992), ￿The Role of Party Reputation in the Forma-
tion of Policy,￿ Journal of Public Economics 49, 107￿121.
Hibbs, D. (1987), The Political Economy of Industrial Democracies,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hibbs, D., and H. Madsen (1981), ￿The Impact of Economic Perfor-
mance on Electoral Support in Sweden, 1967￿1978,￿ Scandinavian Po-
litical Studies 4, 33￿51.
Holmberg, S. (1984), Väljare i förändring, Stockholm: Liber f￿rlag.
J a c k m a n ,R .A . ,R .G .L a y a r d ,a n dS .J .N i c k e l l( 1 9 9 1 ) ,Unemployment:
Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market,O x f o r d ,O x f o r d
University Press.
Johansson, E. (1999), ￿Intergovernmental Grants as a Tactical Instru-
ment: Some Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities,￿ in Es-
says on Local Public Finance and Intergovernmental Grants,D o c t o r a l
dissertation, Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
Jonung, L., and E. Wadensj￿ (1979), ￿The Eﬀect of Unemployment, In-
￿ation and Real Income Growth on Government Popularity in Sweden,￿
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81, 349￿353.
Kinder D. R. and D. R. Kiewiet (1979), ￿Economic Discontent and Polit-
ical Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic
40Judgements in Congressional Voting,￿ American Journal of Political
Science 23, 495￿527.
Kramer, G. H. (1971), ￿Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behav-
ior, 1896￿1964,￿ American Political Science Review 65, 131￿143.
Laver, M., and N. Scho￿eld (1990), Multiparty Government: The Politics
of Coalition in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewin, Leif (1991), Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis-Beck, M. (1988), Economics and Elections, The Major Western
Democracies, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Madsen, H. (1980), ￿Electoral Outcomes and Macro-Economic Policies:
The Scandinavian Cases,￿ in Whiteley, Paul (ed.) (1980), Models of
Political Economy, London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Markus, G. B. (1988), ￿The Impact of Personal and National Economic
Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-sectional Analy-
sis,￿ American Journal of Political Science 32, 137￿154.
Markus, G. B. (1992), ￿The Impact of Personal and National Economic
Conditions on Presidential Voting: 1956-1988,￿ American Journal of
Political Science 36, 829￿834.
Mueller, J. E. (1970), ￿Presidential Popularity from Truman to John-
son,￿ American Political Science Review 64, 18￿34.
Nannestad, P., and M. Paldam.(1994), ￿The VP-function: A Survey of
the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years,￿ Public
Choice 79, 213￿245.
Nannestad, P., and Paldam, M. (1995), ￿It￿s the Government￿s Fault! A
Cross-section Study of Economic Voting in Denmark, 1990/3,￿ European
Journal of Political Research 28, 33￿62.
Nannestad, P., and M. Paldam (1997a), ￿From the Pocketbook of the
Welfare Man: A Pooled Cross-Section Study of Economic Voting in
Denmark 1986￿1992,￿ British Journal of Political Science 27, 119￿136.
Nannestad , P., and M. Paldam (1997b), ￿The Grievance Asymmetry
Revisited: A Micro Study of Economic Voting in Denmark, 1986￿92,￿
European Journal of Political Economy 13, 81￿99.
Paldam, M. (1997), ￿Political Business Cycles￿, in Mueller, Dennis C.
(ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice, A Handbook, Cambridge UK: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini (1990), Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility
and Politics, London: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Pettersson Lidbom, P. (2000), Elections, Party Politics and Economic
Policy, dissertation, Stockholm University.
Riker, W. H., and P. C. Ordeshook (1968), ￿A Theory of the Calculus
of Voting,￿ American Political Science Review 62, 25￿42.
Rogoﬀ, K. (1990), ￿Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,￿ American
Economic Review 80, 21-36.
Rogoﬀ, K., and A. Sibert (1988), ￿Elections and Macroeconomic Policy
Cycles,￿ Review of Economic Studies 55, 1￿16.
41Sanders, D. (2000), ￿The Real Economy and the Perceived Economy:
How Much do Voters Need to Know? A Study of British Data, 1974￿97,￿
Electoral Studies 19, 275—294.
Sargent, T. J. (1979), Macroeconomic Theory, New York: Academic
Press.
¯kerman, J. (1946), Ekonomiskt skeende och politiska förändringar, Lund:
Gleerup.
¯kerman, J. (1947), ￿Political Economic Cycles,￿ Kyklos 1, 107￿117.
42